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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING
By
XILIN ZHOU
August 2015
Committee Chair: Dr. Rusty Tchernis
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation explores issues on women’s employment and children’s health in
economics.
In chapter I, I investigate the causal effects of maternal employment on childhood
obesity. Empirical analysis of the effects of maternal employment on childhood obesity is
complicated by the endogeneity of mother’s labor supply. A mother’s decision to work likely
reflects underlying factors – such as ability and motivation – that could directly influence child
health outcomes. To address this concern, this study implements an instrumental variables (IV)
strategy which utilizes exogenous variation in maternal employment coming from the youngest
sibling’s school eligibility. With data on children ages 7-17 from the 1979 cohort of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth linked to the Child Supplement, I explore the effects of maternal
employment on children’s BMI z-score and probabilities of being overweight and obese. OLS
estimates indicate a moderate association, consistent with the prior literature. However, the IV
estimates show that an increase in mothers’ labor supply leads to large weight gains among
children, suggesting that not addressing the endogeneity of maternal employment leads to
underestimated causal effects.

Chapter II examines the effects of Walmart Supercenters on household and child food
insecurity. Walmart Supercenters may reduce food insecurity by lowering food prices and
expanding food availability. Our food insecurity-related outcomes come from the 2001-2007
waves of the December Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement. We match these
data to our hand-collected data of Walmart Supercenters at the census tract-level. First, we
estimate a naïve linear probability model and find that households and children who live near
Walmart Supercenters are more likely than others to be food insecure. Since the location of
Walmart Supercenters might be endogenous, we then turn to instrumental variables models that
utilize the predictable geographic expansion patterns of Walmart Supercenters outward from
Walmart’s corporate headquarters. The IV estimates suggest that the causal effect of Walmart
Supercenters is to reduce food insecurity among households and children. The effect is largest
among low-income families.
In the third paper, I investigate the effects of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
on women’s labor market outcomes. The FMLA is a federal policy that aims to help workers
balance job and family responsibilities. However, it may have unintended consequences on
employment because it imposes costs on firms. In this study, I investigate the impact of the
FMLA with labor market flows—i.e., hires, separations and recalls. Focusing on labor market
flow outcomes is crucial to identifying the immediate impact of the policy because employment
and wages adjust slowly when there is a policy change while labor market flows are flexible.
Using data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators and adopting a triple-difference model, I get
results that are unlikely to be interpreted as causal because the data are insufficient to obtain
precise estimates. However, the idea of using labor market flows can be easily applied to a broad
range of topics relate to workplace mandates.
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CHAPTER I: MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY:
EVIDENCE USING INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES RELATED TO SIBLING SCHOOL
ELIGIBILITY1
1. Introduction
The statistics on childhood obesity in the U.S. are alarming. From 1971 to 2010, the
childhood obesity rate rose from 5 percent to 17 percent. The increase is especially notable
among school-aged children, as the obesity rate quadrupled for children ages 6 to 11 and tripled
for those ages 12 to 19, compared to doubling for those ages 2 to 5 (Fryar, Carroll, and Ogden,
2012). The prevalence of obesity among children is considered a major public health concern
because of its immediate and long-term effects on health and well-being. According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), obese children are at a higher risk of
developing cardiovascular disease, prediabetes, bone and joint problems, sleep apnea, and
psychological problems. Obese children are also likely to grow up as obese adults and therefore
face the risk of adult obesity-related health problems.2 Obesity imposes substantial costs on
society. The annual medical costs of treating childhood obesity is $14.1 billion for outpatient
costs and $237.6 million for inpatient costs. The estimated cost for treating obese adults is $147
billion per year. In addition, obesity is also associated with indirect costs such as unfavorable
labor market outcomes.
Another remarkable trend in the second half of the 20th Century was increased
employment among women. From 1960 to 2010, the labor force participation rate (LFPR) of
women increased by more than 50 percent. A similar pattern is observed among mothers, as the
LFPR for mothers with children under age 18 increased by 42 percent from 1975 to 2010 (U.S.
1 This research was conducted using restricted data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The views expressed in this
paper do not reflect those of the BLS. Any errors are mine.
2
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm
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Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). The concurrent nature of these trends has led researchers to ask
whether the rise in female labor force participation could have contributed to the increase in
childhood obesity.
Theoretically, the effect of maternal employment on children’s development is
ambiguous. Maternal labor supply could benefit children via increased income, or adversely
affect them due to reduced supervision and less time for home food production (Cawley and Liu,
2012; Duncan, Ziol-Guest, and Kalil, 2010; Fertig, Glomm, and Tchernis, 2009; Sztainer et al.,
2003; Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn, 2002). This ambiguity underscores the need for
empirical evidence when assessing the impacts of maternal work on outcomes such as childhood
obesity.
Such empirical analyses, however, are complicated by the endogeneity of maternal
employment. A mother’s unobserved characteristics – such as general ability level, preferences,
and motivation – likely affect both her labor supply and child care decisions. This creates the
potential for biased estimates of the effects of maternal employment on child health outcomes.
To address the endogeneity concern, this study implements an instrumental variables strategy.
The approach is based on the idea that the opportunity cost of maternal employment is
substantially reduced when the youngest child is attending school, potentially increasing a
mother’s labor supply. Cascio (2009) and Gelbach (2002) established that free public schooling
has a significant effect on maternal employment. Mothers increase labor supply when their
youngest child enrolls in public school. Mothers with younger children, however, exhibit no
employment response when one of the older siblings starts attending school. Observational data
also show that LFPR of women with older children has consistently been larger than that of

2

women with younger children, with a particularly large jump occurring when the youngest child
becomes eligible for kindergarten.3
Specifically, I use two instrumental variables for mother’s labor supply. The first
instrument is an indicator for the kindergarten eligibility of the mother’s youngest child. Since
some children may not enroll in full-time school until first grade, the second instrument is a
binary variable indicating whether the youngest child is eligible for first grade. Data come from
the restricted-access version of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort
(NLSY79), linked to the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult Supplement. The sample is restricted
to school-aged children with younger siblings, with identification coming from the youngest
sibling’s school eligibility status. This ensures that the school eligibility of sample children is not
changing during the sample period. Using the sample of school-aged children, I first find that
mother’s work hours are associated with positive but small increases in children’s BMI z-score
and probabilities of being overweight and obese. These results are consistent with much of the
existing literature. I then implement the instrumental variables strategy in an attempt to obtain
causally interpretable evidence. The results from the IV estimates, both with and without child
fixed effects, suggest that an increase in mother’s work leads to much larger weight gains among
children than those suggested by the naïve specification without instruments. The point estimates
indicate that a mother working ten more hours per week significantly increases the BMI z-score
of her children by 0.07-0.35 points and the probability of being overweight by 4-6 percentage
points. The point estimates for obesity are around 5-8 percentage points. These estimates are
between two and twenty-seven times larger than the corresponding OLS results. Prior studies
may therefore have underestimated the extent to which the rise in female labor force
participation has contributed to the childhood obesity epidemic.
3

See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014) and Morrill (2011).
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2. Literature review
Some important changes occur when mothers increase their labor supply that could
influence childhood obesity. Research finds that working mothers cook less than other mothers,
and that their children eat more away-from-home meals. Working mothers also spend less time
doing physical activities with children. Their children have less supervision and watch TV much
longer (Fertig, Glomm, and Tchernis, 2009; Cawley and Liu, 2012). Although there is some
evidence of offsetting behavior by fathers, it is not nearly enough to offset the changes by
mothers (Cawley and Liu, 2012).
Accordingly, several studies document a positive relationship between maternal
employment and childhood weight problems. Seminal work by Anderson et al. (2003) measures
the effect of a mother’s work over the lifetime of a child on childhood obesity. They find no
evidence that a mother’s number of weeks worked is associated with the probability a 3-11 years
old child is obese. They do, however, find evidence of an effect on the intensive margin: an extra
ten hours per week during weeks worked increases the probability of a child being obese by
around one percentage point (with the exact magnitude varying slightly across specifications).
The impact is largest for higher socioeconomic status (SES) children.
Subsequent studies also indicate positive associations between mothers’ labor supply and
childhood obesity. Ruhm (2008) finds that an extra 20 hours of weekly employment is predicted
to raise obesity (overweight) by 1.6-2.7 (3-4.5) percentage points. Courtemanche (2009)
estimates that a mother working 10 additional hours per week increases a child’s probability of
being obese by 1.6 percentage points, while a mother’s spouse’s work hours have no effect.
Fertig et al. (2009) find that a 10% increase in mothers’ work hours is associated with
approximately a 1.6 percentage point rise in the probability a child is obese. Liu et al. (2009)

4

show that full-time working mothers raise a child’s BMI by about 0.581 units and probability of
being obese by 12.3%. Morrissey et al. (2011) and Morrissey (2012) estimate that every period4
a mother is employed is associated with increases in her child’s BMI Z-score of 0.02 and 0.03,
respectively.
While the existing literature has therefore provided robust evidence of a small positive
association between maternal work and childhood obesity, the extent to which these associations
reflect causal effects remains an open question. For instance, if ambitious, highly-skilled women
are both more likely to enter the labor force and to carefully monitor their children’s eating and
exercise habits, the estimated effect of maternal work on childhood obesity would be
understated. On the other hand, if entering the labor market reflects an underlying preference for
income versus family time, the estimate could be overstated. Reverse causality is another
possible concern. Having a child with health problems may cause a mother to either exit the
labor force to care for the child or enter the labor force to obtain health insurance or extra
income. Measurement error in reported work hours is another potential source of bias. This
would attenuate the estimated effects if the amount of reporting error is random. Some of the
papers in the literature have implemented panel data methods to control for unobserved
heterogeneity (Anderson et al., 2003; Courtemanche, 2009; Miller, 2011; Morrissey et al., 2011),
but these methods do not account for time-varying sources of bias, reverse causality, or
measurement error. Anderson et al. (2003) also estimated an IV specification, using as
instruments state-level variables including unemployment rate, child care regulations, wages of
child care workers, welfare benefit levels, and the status of welfare reform in the state. However,
these instruments were relatively weak in terms of their predictive power on maternal work.

4

A period refers to a data collection period. If a mother answers affirmatively for her employment status during an
interview, she is considered as employed for a period.
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They also relied on questionable exclusion restrictions, as the instruments could influence
childhood obesity through pathways besides maternal work.5 Further investigation is therefore
necessary.
I contribute to the literature by implementing an IV method that aims to produce causally
interpretable evidence on the effect of maternal work on childhood obesity. My approach
exploits plausibly exogenous variation in maternal labor supply coming from the timing of
school eligibility of the youngest child of a mother. The idea behind the instruments comes from
Morrill (2011). She uses a binary indicator for kindergarten eligibility of the youngest child in
the family to instrument for maternal labor supply. Her outcome variables are acute health
conditions that could arise when mothers are working, including hospitalizations, asthma
episodes, injuries, and poisonings. She finds that maternal employment substantially increases
the risk of all these health incidents. In contrast, I focus on a chronic health condition: childhood
obesity.
3. Methodology
The effect of maternal employment on childhood weight status can be estimated by the
following model for child in year :
α

β

γ

(1)

where children’s weight status is the outcome of interest,

is maternal labor supply,

is a set of demographic characteristics of both the child and mother, and and

represent year

and state fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β, which indicates the effect of maternal
employment on children’s weight status.

5

For instance, unemployment rate and the generosity of a state’s welfare program could be associated with changes
in household disposable income or wealth even if mothers’ work hours do not change, and this in turn could affect
children’s weight.
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Estimating this reduced form equation may generate inconsistent results due to the
endogeneity problem of maternal labor supply. Abilities, preferences, and motivation of a mother
could affect both her work decision and her child care quality. If maternal employment reflects
these unobserved factors, the sample of working mothers may not be a random selection of
mother population. As a first attempt to address this issue, I add child fixed effects to equation
(1). Fixed effects will account for time-invariant unobservables, but they do not correct for timevarying unobservables, reverse causality, or measurement error in the independent variable of
interest. Without addressing all sources of endogeneity bias, estimates of β do not reflect the
causal effect of maternal employment on child obesity.
A possible solution to the problems stated above is IV estimation. In this study, I use two
instrumental variables for maternal employment, both of which are constructed based on the age
of the youngest child of a mother. The first one is a binary variable indicating whether the
youngest child is eligible for public kindergarten. In the U.S., children age five or older are
eligible to attend free public kindergarten. Kindergarten eligibility of the youngest child
substantially reduces the opportunity cost of a mother’s working, providing an incentive for the
rise in maternal employment. This instrument captures a particular discrete jump in maternal
labor supply that is documented by Morrill (2011). However, there is a reason to suspect that the
increase in maternal labor supply from children reaching school age does not entirely occur at
kindergarten. In many states, public kindergarten is either not mandatory or only lasts a half day.
As of 2012, only 16 states mandated kindergarten attendance among age-eligible children, and
only 12 states were required to offer a full-day kindergarten program while another 34 states
required half-day kindergarten.6 It is therefore possible that another discrete jump in maternal
labor force participation or working hours occurs when the youngest child becomes eligible for
6

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_3.asp
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first grade. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, In 1980s and 1990s,
although 85-89 percentage of age-eligible children enrolled in kindergarten, only 30-50
percentage were enrolled full-day.7 Therefore, for a fair amount of mothers first grade might be
the time at which the youngest child is able to attend school for a full day. I therefore use as a
second instrument a binary variable equals to the eligibility for the first grade of the youngest
child.8
A child’s public schooling has been found to have significant predictive power on
maternal labor supply (Cascio 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2012; Gelbach, 2002; Morrill, 2011). However,
children’s actual school enrollment age is endogenous because it is determined not only by state
legislation but also by parents’ willingness to enroll their children, as “redshirting” is popular
(Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, the predicted school enrollment age, instead of the actual
school attending age, is a preferred instrument since it provides an intent-to-treat effect for
maternal labor supply.
Using these instruments requires the assumption that they do not affect children’s weight
through any pathways other than maternal labor supply. An obvious concern is that the change in
school eligibility of a youngest child may have a direct effect on his/her own health (Anderson et
al., 2011; Zhang and Zhang, 2011). To improve the validity of the instruments, I therefore
restrict the sample to the older children (aged 7 to 17) in the family whose school eligibility
status remains the same when their youngest sibling enters school. The IV estimator evaluates
the local average treatment effect (LATE) of maternal employment for school-aged children
whose mother’s employment was previously constrained by child care responsibilities.

7

https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_202.10.asp
Another discrete jump could occur with pre-kindergarten, which serves 4 years old children. However, unlike
kindergarten and first grade, pre-kindergarten is not free and not universally available in many states. Cascio (2009)
and Fitzpatrick (2010) find limited impact of pre-kindergarten on women’s labor supply.
8
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Identification of the instrumental variables estimation comes from variations in the date
of birth (DOB) of the youngest child and the state-specific cutoff date for kindergarten and first
grade eligibility. The first source of variation means that two otherwise identical children have
mothers facing different incentives to work as a result of the age of the youngest sibling. One
child’s mother may be working since the youngest sibling is six years old while the other child’s
mother may not be working because the youngest sibling is four years old. Even if the two
children have youngest siblings of the same age, there could be variation in public school
eligibility if they live in different states. In the U.S., individual states have the authority to
determine the cutoff dates by which a child must have turned 5 (6) years old in order to be
eligible to enroll in kindergarten (first grade). Assume two youngest siblings both born on
September 15th 2005, but one of them lives in Georgia and one lives in Louisiana. They will turn
5 years old on September 15th 2010. However, the one in Louisiana can go to kindergarten in
2010 because he/she fulfills the age requirement before the September 30th cutoff; while the one
in Georgia has to wait for the next year since the child is still four years old on the cutoff date of
September 1st in 2010. The cutoff dates of school-year vary across states and also change during
the sample period. The combination of the DOB and cutoff dates therefore generates substantial
variation.
The IV model takes the following form:
(2)
(3)
Equation (2) gives the first stage regression, with coefficients denoted by the
subscript, while equation (3) is the second stage regression, with coefficients having the
subscript.

indicates the two instrumental variables. I estimate the model both with and

9

without child fixed effects, which I refer to as the IV-FE specification and the IV specification,
respectively. The IV-FE model goes further than the IV model toward accounting for
endogeneity bias, as it controls for possible unobserved heterogeneity in fertility patterns.
However, the IV model is likely more efficient than the IV-FE specification. We therefore
present and discuss results from both models.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
Data come from the restricted version of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
Cohort (NLSY79). The original sample of the NLSY79 contains 12,682 individuals, half male
and half female, who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979. These individuals were
followed annually from 1979 to 1994 and then biannually through 2010. Starting in 1986, a
supplemental survey, the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult (NLSCYA), was conducted
biannually. It includes assessments of all biological children of the original female participants.
Information was collected from either the mother or the child9, and it can be linked to the main
NLSY79 through the mother’s identifier. I use the matched mother-children records from all
waves in which both the NLSY79 and the NLSCYA are available, i.e. biannually from 1986 to
2010.
There are three outcomes of interest, BMI z-score (BMIZ) and indicators for overweight
and obesity, all of which are constructed based on children’s BMI10. BMI is a commonly-used
proxy for body fat in adults. However, it is not a proper measure for adiposity in children due to
biological reasons. Therefore, the CDC suggests using BMIZ instead of BMI for children. BMIZ
is a standardized measure of BMI using age-and-gender specific BMI distributions from the
2000 growth chart (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002). The main advantage of BMIZ is
9

Before 1994, a mother reported information for all her children regardless of the age of children. After 1994,
children above 15 years of age answered interview questions by themselves.
10
BMI is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (kg/m2).
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that it is comparable across age and sex. The other two outcomes are also computed according to
the 2000 growth chart. If a child’s BMI is above the 85th (95th) percentile of the BMI distribution
of the corresponding reference population, the child is considered overweight (obese).
Maternal employment is computed using the week-by-week array of the complete work
history for each participant. The longitudinal work history data in the NLSY79 include an
indicator for whether the participant is working and the number of working hours in each week
from January 1, 1978 to the latest interview date11. Utilizing work history data, I construct
employment in a retrospective manner during two time spans12: a month (4 weeks) before the
interview and a year (52 weeks) prior to the interview. In each time span maternal employment is
assessed by two variables: the fraction of weeks employed13 and the average hours worked per
week. There are therefore four measures of maternal labor supply, and I use each of them
separately in a single regression.14 Using one-month labor supply variables captures the
immediate impact of maternal employment on child weight, while using one-year variables
captures a slightly more cumulative effect. Some papers in the literature estimate an even more
cumulative effect by measuring maternal work as average work hours over the course of the
child’s entire life (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Courtemanche, 2009). My IV strategy – which
relies on sharp discontinuities at a particular age – is inherently better suited for the identification

11

See the NLSY79 codebook supplement for more information:
http://www.bls.gov/nls/79quex/r19/y79r19append18.pdf
12
The NLSY79 provides two sets of ready-to-use employment measures: employment since date of last interview
and employment in last calendar year. Despite that these measures are easily accessible, they are not able to capture
the abrupt change in employment at the point when the youngest child is eligible to kindergarten. In addition, some
participants may have skipped one or more waves of interview, thus result in imprecise measurements of
employment since date of last interview.
13
For example, if a mother works 3 weeks in the month before the interview, then she works 75 percent of the time.
The advantage of using the fraction of weeks worked, in contrast to using the number of weeks worked, is that it
makes the scale of the variables comparable across the two time spans.
14
I considered including two or more of these measures together in the same regression, but I was unable to find a
set of instruments that was strong enough to precisely identify the impacts of multiple endogenous variables.

11

of short-run rather than long-run impacts. It is therefore noteworthy that, despite this limitation, I
will still obtain much larger effects than these prior studies.
A key component to this analysis is the use of instrumental variables. The restricted
NLSY79 has not only the DOB of all children but also their states of residence. I first calculate
the age in weeks for the youngest child in each household. Then the first IV, an indicator for
whether the youngest sibling is eligible for kindergarten, is given by whether the youngest child
reaches 260 weeks of age (5 years old) before his/her state of residence’s cutoff date for the
school year. State cutoff dates come from Evans et al. (2010). The second IV, an indicator for
first grade eligibility, equals one if the youngest child is 312 weeks of age (6 years old) before
the cutoff date.
I also utilize the extensive information available in the NLSY79 to include a set of
demographic control variables. These include gender, race/ethnicity (Hispanic, African
American, and others15), whether the child had a high birth weight (> 8.8 pounds)16, whether the
child was breastfed, child’s age in years, family income, and family size (one to three persons,
four persons, and five or more persons). Regressions also control for the mother’s age, the
mother’s AFQT score, education level of the mother (less than high school, high school
graduate, some college, and college degree or higher education), and whether the mother is
married and lives with a spouse. I also use limited information available in the NLSCYA for
father to construct an indicator for close child-father attachment (equals one if father lives in the
household, father lives within 10 miles, or child has seen father at least once a week in the past
year). In addition, self-reported data on height and weight usually suffer from systematic
reporting error that leads to underestimation of the prevalence of obesity (Goodman, Hinden, and
15

Other races include those who identify themselves as nonblack/non-Hispanic.
The threshold of high birth weight can be found
http://www.cdc.gov/pednss/what_is/pednss_health_indicators.htm

16
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Khandelwal, 2000; Kuczmarski, Kuczmarski, and Najjar, 2001). I thus add indicators for
whether height or weight are self-reported17 in all specifications.
The regression sample is restricted to children who meet three criteria: 1) they are seven
to seventeen years old, 2) they have at least one younger sibling, and 3) their youngest sibling’s
schooling eligibility changed during the sample period. The first restriction ensures that school
eligibility does not change for the sample children. As discussed above, this eliminates the
obvious concern that one’s own school eligibility could affect one’s own weight for reasons
other than maternal employment. The second restriction is necessary for the use of IVs. The third
restriction is used to eliminate those whose mothers never receive the treatment induced by the
IVs. I name the resulting sample the “main sample”.18
Since employing several sample restrictions raises obvious concerns about external
validity, I also prepare two alternative samples with fewer constraints. One alternative is called
the “extended sample”. This sample only restricts the age of the focal children; it does not
employ the second and third restrictions. The other alternative, named the “comparison sample”,
is the same as the extended sample but only includes 1986 to 1996 – the years used by Anderson
et al. (2003). This enables assessment of whether differences in our results and theirs could
simply be attributable to the longer sample period.
The main sample includes 16,535 observations from 4,119 children of 2,575 mothers.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main sample, with all estimates weighted by the
17

The interview questions concerning the measurements of height and weight change frequently during the research
period. There were only two modes at the beginning: mother report and interviewer measure. The questions evolved
gradually and eventually there are four options: mother report, child report, interviewer measure, and others. In
addition, young adults who are above age 15 were interviewed independently since 1996. Their height and weight
data are all self-reported. To simplify the classifications, I create an indicator which represents all modes except
interviewer measure for height and weight data and call it self-reported mode.
18
Other steps to improve data quality include dropping children with extreme BMIs (z-score exceeding +/-5),
children who have shrinking height from the previous interview, children who do not live with their mothers, female
children who are pregnant or ever have given birth, and those whose mothers do not have any valid employment
data.
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children’s sampling weights. The average BMI z-score is 0.29, and 27% of the children are
overweight while 12% of them are obese. On average, the fractions of weeks that mothers
worked in the past month and in the past year are both 65%, equivalent to 2.6 weeks and 33.8
weeks, respectively. The average hours worked per week is around 23.2, both for employment
measured in a month and in a year. One concern about the data quality is for family income. In
the sample about 14% of children do not have income data. I impute missing values of income as
the sample mean, and I add an indicator for observations if income is imputed in all regressions
to mitigate bias.
The extended sample has a larger sample size of 34,939 observations, and the comparison
sample has a smaller size of 15,602 observations. Table 18 in Appendix A shows the summary
statistics for the main, extended, and the comparison samples. The key characteristics in the two
alternative samples are similar to those from the main sample. The extended sample has a BMIZ
of 0.35 and 29% (13%) overweight (obese) children, while the comparison sample has a BMIZ
of 0.24 and the same proportions of overweight and obese children as the main sample. Other
minor differences among the three samples are as expected given the nature of the restrictions.
For instance, the education level of mothers in the comparison sample is lower because these
mothers were still young during 1986 and 1996 and some of them had not graduated from school
yet.
5. Results
5.1 OLS estimates
Table 2 presents the results from estimating the associations between maternal
employment and the child weight outcomes using each of the three samples. A single cell reports
the coefficient estimate for maternal employment from separate OLS regressions. In other words,
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the four maternal employment variables are not included together in the same regression, in
order to retain comparability with the subsequent IV estimates.19 The first column uses the main
sample, the second column utilizes the extended sample, and the third column uses the
comparison sample. As discussed previously, all specifications include year and state fixed
effects as well as children’s and mothers’ demographic controls. Estimates are weighted using
the child sampling weights. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by
mothers.
The results in Table 2 indicate a positive and significant relationship between the labor
supply of mothers and the weight status of children across different specifications. In the main
sample, ten more work hours per week raise children’s BMIZ by 0.03-0.04 points and the
likelihood of being overweight (obese) by 0.5-0.8 (0.3-0.4) percentage points. The weeks worked
is also positively and significantly related to weight outcomes. Since it is measured as the faction
of weeks a mother worked in a month or in a year, the point estimates for the one-month and one
year measures are comparable. If a mother works one additional week (25 percent of her time) in
a month, that will increase her children’s BMIZ by 1.6 points and the probability of being
overweight (obese) by 0.2 (0.21) percentage points. Similarly, if a mother works one additional
month (8 percent of her time) in a year, her children will have 0.77 points of higher BMIZ and
0.14 (0.1) percentage points of higher likelihood of being overweight (obese). This positive and
significant association between maternal employment and children’s weight status persists across
the three samples. In short, Table 2 suggests that my results are not likely to differ from those
obtained by other studies (particularly Anderson et al., 2003) merely because of differences in
the sample. I therefore only use the main sample throughout the duration of the paper.

19

I also tried probit models for outcomes overweight and obesity. The results are close to the OLS estimates in
terms of magnitude and significance.
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5.2 IV estimates
Using the main sample, Table 3 evaluates the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of
child fixed effects and the use of IV. The first column in Table 3 simply reprints the first column
of Table 2, which reports the coefficient estimate from the OLS regression with the main sample.
Column (2) adds the child fixed effects. Interestingly, accounting for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity eliminates most of the significant associations between the maternal employment
variables and child weight outcomes. However, the fixed effects models likely do not reveal
causal effects, as concerns about time-variant omitted variables, reverse causality, and
measurement error still remain.
Column (3) reports the second-stage results of the IV model without child fixed effects.
The coefficients for all maternal employment measures are positive and large in magnitude,
although insignificant for BMIZ. A mother’s additional week (25 percent of her time) employed
in the past month increases a child’s P(Overweight) by 4 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 4.5
percentage points. Ten more work hours per week in the past month increases P(Overweight) by
4.7 percentage points and P(Obese) by 5.2 percentage points. One more month (8 percent of her
time) worked in the past year raises P(Overweight) by 1.2 percentage points and P(Obese) by 1.4
percentage points. An additional ten hours worked per week over the past year increases
P(Overweight) by 4.4 percentage points and P(Obese) by 4.9 percentage points. Compared to the
OLS estimates without child fixed effects, the IV estimates are 2 to 4 times larger when the
outcome is BMIZ and 6 to 21 times larger when the outcome is overweight or obesity. Despite
the fact that the standard errors rise considerably when using IV, IV estimates for overweight and
obesity are significant at the 5% level or better. The IV estimates for BMIZ are insignificant
because of the large standard errors, but their magnitudes still suggest that the corresponding
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OLS estimates are likely conservative. In short, the results using IV without child fixed effects
suggest that maternal employment causes children to be overweight and obese, and the effect is
larger than documented in the naïve OLS estimates.
Column (4) presents the IV-FE estimates. This model goes the furthest toward addressing
causality, as it addresses endogeneity bias in two ways: FE to eliminate time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity and IV to address remaining issues with time-variant omitted variable
bias, reverse causality, or measurement error. The second-stage coefficient estimates for BMI zscore, overweight, and obesity are all positive and large. A mother’s additional week (25 percent
of her time) employed in the past month increases a child’s BMIZ by 0.29, P(Overweight) by 6
percentage points, and P(Obese) by 7 percentage points. An additional ten hours per week in the
current month raises BMIZ by 0.35, P(Overweight) by 5.5 percentage points, and P(Obese) by
7.7 percentage points. One more month (8 percent of a mother’s time) worked in the past year
increases BMIZ by 7.4, P(Overweight) by 0.019 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 0.02
percentage points. An increase of ten hours per week over the past year raises BMIZ by 0.26,
P(Overweight) by 4.3 percentage points, and P(Obese) by 5.8 percentage points. The IV-FE
standard errors are even larger than those using IV without FE, nonetheless the effects on BMIZ
and obesity are all significant at the 10% level or better. The magnitudes of the IV-FE estimates
are between 14 and 157 times larger than those of the corresponding FE estimates without IV.
Compared to the IV estimates without child FE, the IV-FE estimates are roughly four times as
large when BMIZ is the outcome, similarly sized when overweight is the outcome, and about
half larger when obesity is the outcome. Therefore, there is clear evidence that implementing the
IV approach increases the estimated effects, but it is not clear whether adding FE to the IV model
makes a meaningful difference. Importantly, the IV-FE estimates are 3 to 15 times larger than
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those from the prior studies that used comparable specifications20 (Anderson et al., 2003;
Courtemanche, 2009; Ruhm, 2008). In short, these comparisons suggest that insufficiently
addressing the endogeneity problem of maternal labor supply leads to underestimation of its
causal effect of child weight.
5.3 Validity of IVs
Table 4-6 present tests of the key assumptions required by the IV approach. First, the IV
model requires that the IVs influence the endogenous labor supply variables. Table 4 therefore
presents the first-stage coefficient estimates of interest from the IV and IV-FE models, along
with the F statistic from a test of the joint significance of the instruments. The first-stage Fstatistic is much larger than the standard criteria of 10 in most specifications. The instruments
therefore have sufficient predictive power to rule out a weak instrument problem. Turning to the
individual coefficient estimates, in the IV model, the binary instrument for kindergarten
eligibility is only significant in one of the four maternal employment specifications (fraction of
weeks employed in the past year), whereas the indicator for first grade eligibility is strongly
significant in all specifications. In the IV-FE model, the indicator for kindergarten eligibility has
strong significant coefficients in all specifications, while the indicator for first grade eligibility
has significant coefficient only for fraction of working weeks.
The IV strategy also assumes that the instruments can be excluded from the second stage
regression; i.e. they only influence child weight through their effect on maternal work,
conditional on the controls. Table 5 presents the Hansen J statistics from one test of this
assumption: the over-identification test. Each cell represents p-values from a separate overidentification test, where the null hypothesis is that the set of instruments is valid. The p-values
20

Anderson et al. (2003) find that 10 hours of additional work every week increase children’s probability to be
obese by 1 percentage point. Courtemanche (2009) and Ruhm (2008) document a 2 percentages points of
magnitude.
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are all over 0.3 in the IV specifications. The p-values are never below 0.1 in the IV-FE models.
The second test for this condition is to regress both the endogenous variable and the IVs in the
same regression. Table 6 shows results from this test, with obesity for the outcome variable.
While controlling for maternal employment, the coefficients for both IVs are never significant.
In other words, I do not find clear evidence that the set of instruments is invalid.
5.4 Subgroup analysis
In this section, I explore the heterogeneous effects of maternal employment on child
weight status for subgroups, with obesity as the outcome variable. I divide the main sample
based on children’s gender, race, poverty status, and mother’s marital status. Each cell of Table 7
reports a coefficient coming from a separate regression. I only use the IV specifications because
insufficient subgroup sample size prevents the IV-FE models from producing precise estimates.
The first column of Table 7 reprints the IV estimates in Table 3 for reference. Columns
(2) and (3) record the results for girls and boys. Maternal employment has a significant and large
impact on girls’ obesity. If a mother works 10 more hours every week in the past year, her girl
children are 7.7 percentage points more likely to be obese. The estimates for boys are small in
magnitude and insignificant. Column (4)-(6) disaggregate the main sample by race/ethnicity.
Among Hispanics, blacks, and those of other races/ethnicities, maternal employment has
significant and substantial effects on children in other races (such white, Asian, etc.). If a mother
works 10 additional hours every week in the past year, her white children will be 6.5 percentage
points more likely to be obese. However, the effects of maternal employment on Hispanic and
black children are small and insignificant. The effects are even negative in sign for the latter.
Column (7) and (8) present the results for poor and non-poor children. The NLSY79
classifies a family as in poverty if family income over the past year below the family size
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adjusted poverty level. Because some participants do not report their financial status, the
subsample analysis only applied to those who have valid data for poverty status21. Compared to
poor children, maternal employment has significant effects on children from non-poor families.
The last two columns reports results for children with married mother and non-married mothers.
If a mother is married and live with spouse, her employment will have a significant effects on her
children’s obesity. Results documented in these subgroup analysis consistent to findings
documented in other papers. Anderson et al. (2003) and Ruhm (2008) also find that maternal
employment has a larger deleterious impact on children from high socioeconomic status families.
6. Conclusion and discussion
This paper explores the causal effect of maternal employment on child weight status.
With panel data on children age seven to seventeen from the NLSY79, I first replicate previous
research by demonstrating a small, positive association between maternal employment and
childhood obesity. Then, I use kindergarten and first grade eligibility as instruments for maternal
employment. IV and IV-FE models suggest that maternal employment increases children’s BMI
z-score and probabilities of being overweight and obese. The effects are much larger once the
endogeneity of labor supply is addressed, and they are also larger than those previously
estimated in the literature.
The existing literature has documented a small positive association between maternal
work and childhood obesity. However, these studies either do not address the endogeneity of
maternal labor supply or only partially account for unobserved heterogeneity. Prior papers on
this topic urged further investigation with instruments for maternal employment which are valid
and have strong predicting power (Anderson et al., 2003; Cawley and Liu, 2012; Ruhm, 2008). I
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Around 2,500 observations have missing data for poverty status, thus are excluded from this group of subsample
analysis.
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therefore utilize an IV strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in maternal labor
supply coming from the timing of school eligibility of the youngest child of a mother. My
findings contribute to the literature by adding causally interpretable evidence that maternal
employment raises the risk of children having unfavorable weight outcomes. However, the
design of the IV strategy requires that only children who are school-aged with siblings are
included in the sample. Therefore, the results presented here are not necessarily applicable to all
children. Further investigation is also needed to explore how the effects might vary by
subgroups, such as by gender, race, socioeconomic status, and by father’s work status.
The results, however, should not be interpreted as discouraging women’s labor supply, or
as claiming that mothers’ employment has had a negative net impact on society. My findings
instead highlight the importance of further investigation into the mechanisms through which
maternal employment might affect children’s health. Possible mechanisms include the changes in
family routine, diet, and time allocation induced by mothers’ labor supply. Maternal employment
is likely to reduce beneficial routines, such as regular family meals and physical activities with
children. At the same time, maternal employment might lead to unhealthy routines, such as
television watching and restaurant meals. Prior research has found associations between
maternal employment and time use (Cawley and Liu, 2012; Fertig et al, 2009), but causal
evidence – perhaps using the identification strategy from this paper – is needed.
Another possible mechanism is the child care setting. For example, if child care
subsidies, such as the child care and development fund (CCDF), encourage working mothers to
rely on center-based child care service, the use of non-parental child care may influence
children’s diet and activity to some extent (Blau and Tekin, 2007; Herbst and Tekin, 2010). In
addition, the availability of relative care, especially from grandparents, has substantial positive
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effect on mothers’ labor supply (Compton and Pollak, 2014). Grandparents may put fewer
restrictions on their grandchildren’s diet and activities (Maher et al., 2008), thus increasing the
risk of children being obese.
Understanding the mechanisms of the effects of maternal employment on childhood
obesity is not only of academic interest, but it would also shed light on policies to help reverse
the obesity epidemic. For example, if supervision is an important mechanism, promoting afterschool programs would be a beneficial policy. Such programs not only increase children’s
physical activity level directly, they also help children to form healthy habits and promote health
education among parents (Annesi et al., 2007; Annesi, Moore, & Dixon, 2008). Alternatively, if
nutrition is the main mechanism, policies related to food labeling (Bollinger, Leslie, and
Sorensen, 2010; Tandon et al., 2010) and quality of school meals (Foster et al., 2007; Story,
Nanney, and Schwartz, 2009) could have a strong effect. Understanding the relative impact of
each of the mechanisms would be the first step to inform policy makers.
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7. Tables
Table 1 Summary Statistics, all estimates are weighted using the child's sampling weight.

Children's Info
BMI z-score
Overweight
Obesity
Height is self-report
Weight is self-report
Family size, less than 3 persons
Family size, 4 persons
Family size, 5 or more persons
Family income, $1000
Child's age, in year
Child is Hispanic
Child is African American
Attachment to father
Child is female
High birth weight
Breastfed
Mother's Info.
Edu.,less than high school
Edu.,high school graduate
Edu.,some college
Edu.,college degree or higher
Mother's age
AFQT score (2006 standard)
Married, live with spouse
Mothers' Employment
Fraction of weeks worked in past month
Hours worked per week in past month, in unit 10
Fraction of weeks worked in past year
Hours worked per week in past year, in unit 10
IV
Binary if the yst child is eligible for kindergarten
Binary if the yst child is eligible for first grade
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Main Sample (N=16535)
Mean
SD
Min.

Max.

0.29
0.27
0.12
0.51
0.52
4.86
0.09
0.36
60.58
12.02
0.08
0.15
0.77
0.49
0.1
0.57

1.15
0.44
0.33
0.5
0.5
1.28
0.28
0.48
78.21
3.09
0.27
0.36
0.41
0.5
0.3
0.48

-4.98
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0

3.12
1
1
1
1
15
1
1
974.1
17
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.12
0.44
0.23
0.21
36.64
47.64
0.73

0.32
0.5
0.42
0.41
5.42
28.22
0.44

0
0
0
0
21
0
0

1
1
1
1
53
100
1

0.65
2.32
0.65
2.32

0.46
2
0.43
1.9

0
0
0
0

1
9.6
1
9.6

0.53
0.46

0.5
0.5

0
0

1
1

Table 2 OLS estimates of the impact of maternal employment on children' weight status (robust standard
errors in parentheses)
Outcome

Time span

Maternal emp.

(1)
Main
(N=16535)

(2)
Extended
(N=34939)

(3)
Comparison
(N=15602)

BMI Z-score

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked

0.062**
(0.024)
0.026***
(0.0055)
0.096***
(0.027)
0.036***
(0.0058)
0.0068
(0.0091)
0.0045**
(0.0021)
0.017*
(0.0098)
0.0074***
(0.0022)
0.0077
(0.0066)
0.0029*
(0.0015)
0.012*
(0.0070)
0.0044***
(0.0016)

0.049***
(0.017)
0.021***
(0.0038)
0.084***
(0.019)
0.032***
(0.0041)
0.0032
(0.0066)
0.0031**
(0.0015)
0.017**
(0.0072)
0.0069***
(0.0016)
0.0087*
(0.0049)
0.0037***
(0.0011)
0.012**
(0.0053)
0.0053***
(0.0012)

0.054**
(0.027)
0.021***
(0.0060)
0.093***
(0.029)
0.030***
(0.0063)
0.0056
(0.0097)
0.0036
(0.0022)
0.016
(0.011)
0.0052**
(0.0023)
0.012*
(0.0068)
0.0043***
(0.0016)
0.019**
(0.0074)
0.0055***
(0.0017)

Hours worked per week
Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Overweight

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Obesity

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10.
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Table 3 IV estimates with/without child FE of the impact of maternal employment on children' weight status (robust standard errors in
parentheses)
Outcome variable

Time span

Maternal emp.

BMI Z-score

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Overweight

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Obesity

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

(1)
OLS

(2)
FE

(3)
IV

(4)
IV-FE

0.062**
(0.024)
0.026***
(0.0055)
0.096***
(0.027)
0.036***
(0.0058)
0.0068
(0.0091)
0.0045**
(0.0021)
0.017*
(0.0098)
0.0074***
(0.0022)
0.0077
(0.0066)
0.0029*
(0.0015)
0.012*
(0.0070)
0.0044***
(0.0016)

0.0074
(0.024)
0.0039
(0.0057)
0.049*
(0.028)
0.016**
(0.0065)
-0.0052
(0.0097)
-0.0024
(0.0023)
0.011
(0.011)
0.0016
(0.0027)
0.0042
(0.0071)
-0.0014
(0.0017)
0.014
(0.0085)
0.00080
(0.0020)

0.24
(0.24)
0.069
(0.072)
0.25
(0.24)
0.066
(0.067)
0.16*
(0.095)
0.047*
(0.028)
0.15
(0.092)
0.044*
(0.026)
0.18**
(0.071)
0.052**
(0.021)
0.17**
(0.068)
0.049**
(0.020)

1.16**
(0.53)
0.35**
(0.16)
0.93**
(0.38)
0.26**
(0.11)
0.24
(0.20)
0.055
(0.057)
0.15
(0.15)
0.043
(0.041)
0.29*
(0.16)
0.077*
(0.046)
0.21*
(0.11)
0.058*
(0.032)

Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10.
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Table 4 First-stage estimate of the IV and the IV-FE models.
Time span

Maternal emp.

Panel A: IV model
Past month
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Panel B: IV-FE model
Past month
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

(1)

(2)

(3)

Kindergarten
eligibility

First grade
eligibility

F-test

0.020
(0.015)
0.058
(0.062)
0.030**
(0.014)
0.073
(0.059)

0.093***
(0.015)
0.32***
(0.063)
0.088***
(0.014)
0.34***
(0.060)

0.027**
(0.013)
0.12**
(0.050)

0.023*
(0.013)
0.044
(0.052)

9.7

0.044***
(0.011)
0.16***
(0.046)

0.020*
(0.011)
0.071
(0.045)

22.3
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54.4
33.4
67.3
42.3

7
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Table 5 Over-identification test. Chi-sq(1) P-value are reported.
Outcome

Time span

Panel A: IV model
BMI Z-score
Past month
Past year
Overweight

Past month
Past year

Obese

Past month
Past year

Panel B: IV-FE model
BMI Z-score
Past month
Past year
Overweight

Past month
Past year

Obese

Past month
Past year

(1)
Hansen J Stat. Pvalue

Maternal emp.

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

0.32
0.31
0.35
0.32
0.48
0.5
0.42
0.48
0.97
0.99
0.85
0.97

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week
Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

0.41
0.71
0.6
0.6
0.21
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.63
0.43
0.43
0.44

Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10.
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Table 6 Endogenous variables and the IVs in one regression with obesity for the outcome variable.
Maternal emp.

Past month

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

Past year

Fraction of weeks worked
Hours worked per week

(1)

(2)

(3)

Endogenous
variable

Kindergarten
eligibility

First grade
eligibility

0.0061
(0.0066)
0.0026*
(0.0015)
0.010
(0.0071)
0.0041**
(0.0016)

0.0030
(0.010)
0.0030
(0.010)
0.0028
(0.010)
0.0028
(0.010)

0.016
(0.011)
0.016
(0.011)
0.016
(0.011)
0.015
(0.011)
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Table 7 Subgroup analysis of the impact of maternal employment on children' weight status (robust standard errors in parentheses)
Outcome

Time
span

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

Main
sample

Girl

Boy

Hispanic

African
America

White
and other

Poor

Not
poor

Married

Not
married

0.18**

0.25**

0.096

0.053

-0.063

0.24***

0.12

0.20*

0.17**

0.14

(0.071)

(0.12)

(0.088)

(0.16)

(0.14)

(0.090)

(0.13)

(0.10)

(0.078)

(0.17)

0.052**

0.086**

0.026

0.018

-0.018

0.073***

0.037

0.057*

0.052**

0.043

(0.021)

(0.044)

(0.024)

(0.051)

(0.037)

(0.028)

(0.038)

(0.031)

(0.025)

(0.049)

0.17**

0.23**

0.098

0.043

-0.039

0.23***

0.16

0.21**

0.17**

0.12

(0.068)

(0.11)

(0.087)

(0.16)

(0.13)

(0.085)

(0.14)

(0.11)

(0.079)

(0.14)

0.049**

0.077**

0.025

0.012

-0.013

0.065***

0.046

0.055*

0.051**

0.037

(0.020)
Number of
16,535
obs.
Note: hours worked per week is in unit 10.

(0.037)

(0.023)

(0.047)

(0.038)

(0.024)

(0.041)

(0.028)

(0.024)

(0.039)

8,182

8,353

3,686

5,080

7,769

3,957

10,085

10,626

5,909

Obesity

Past
month

Maternal emp.

Fraction of
weeks worked
Hours worked
per week

Past
year

Fraction of
weeks worked
Hours worked
per week
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CHAPTER II: DO WALMART SUPERCENTERS IMPROVE FOOD SECURITY?22
1. Introduction
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s Food and Nutrition Service
seeks to eliminate child hunger by 2015. At the same time, certain municipalities (like Los
Angeles, Chicago, and New York City) are working to prevent big box retailers like Walmart
from opening within the city limits, while some states and municipalities have passed laws,
taxes, and mandates targeting Walmart specifically and seeking to make it harder for them to do
business (Hicks 2007: 267-293). This is in spite of research showing that entry by Walmart
Supercenters leads to lower food prices, particularly for low-income consumers (Basker and
Noel, 2009). Are these new barriers to entry at odds with the Food and Nutrition Service’s goal
of eliminating child hunger? How should the Food and Nutrition Service advise governments
that are making local development policy? We add to existing research on food security by
exploring the relationship between the diffusion of new retail technologies—specifically, the
Walmart Supercenter mass merchandiser format—and various outcomes indicative of food
insecurity.
Addressing food security is an important part of a broad anti-poverty strategy. Existing
research shows that higher food prices increase food insecurity (Gregory and Coleman-Jensen,
2011) and that families with more workers in “nonstandard” sectors tend to be less food secure
(Coleman-Jensen, 2011). Some programs (like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program)
have improved food security (Gunderson et al., 2011). We expand on the existing literature by
examining how a broad structural change in the American retail sector affects food security.

This research was conducted using restricted data of the Current Population Survey at the Atlanta Research Data
Center (ARDC). The views expressed in this paper do not reflect those of the Bureau of Census, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, or the ARDC. Any errors are mine.

22

30

Carden (2012) surveys the history of American retail and discusses “the rise of massmarket merchandisers” like Walmart and Costco. In 1988, Walmart expanded into large-scale
food retail when it opened its first Walmart Supercenter. Today, Walmart is the country’s largest
grocer. Walmart Supercenters are by far the dominant supercenter chain, with 2907 locations in
2011 compared to 251 Super Targets and 26 Super K-marts.23 Courtemanche and Carden (2011)
find that Walmart Supercenters increase obesity, but they did not examine the other side of the
coin: Walmart’s “everyday low prices” could also reduce hunger and improve nourishment. We
aim to fill this void.
There are a number of mechanisms by which Walmart Supercenters might affect food
security. The first (and most obvious) was identified by Basker and Noel (2009). Walmart
Supercenters offer low prices, but they also exert pressure on existing food retailers to lower
their prices. Indeed, Basker and Noel (2009) find that the largest price reductions after Walmart
Supercenter entry come at stores that serve primarily low-income consumers. Hausman and
Leibtag (2009) and Furman (2005) argue that the consumer benefits from diffusion of massmarket merchandisers are considerable and progressively distributed: the major beneficiaries of
these firms’ lower prices are low-income consumers who spend large percentages of their
incomes on food. It is possible that, in light of these lower prices and progressively-distributed
benefits, entry by Walmart Supercenters improves food security.
There are also other mechanisms by which Walmart Supercenters could conceivably
affect food security. First, they add to the local food supply, and Walmart often opens stores in
rural “food deserts” that lack sufficient options for fresh produce. Second, these stores could
impact food security through their effects on employment and wages, which could work in either
direction and are the subject of debate in the literature (Basker, 2005; Neumark et al., 2008;
23

These numbers come from the three companies’ 2011 annual reports.
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Dube and Jacobs, 2004; Dube et al., 2007). Moreover, Coleman-Jensen (2011) argues that
“nonstandard” work is associated with greater food insecurity, and big box chains’ effect on the
share of “nonstandard” versus “standard” work is also ambiguous. Pope and Pope (2012) claim
that Walmart entry raises real estate values, and Guo (2011) argue s that more home assets are
associated with more food security.
We estimate the impacts of Walmart Supercenters on food security using data from the
2001-2007 waves of the December Current Population Study Food Security Supplement (CPSFSS) matched with primary data on Walmart Supercenter locations. Our outcomes are counts of
the number of affirmative responses on the household and child-specific portions of the food
insecurity questionnaire, along with binary variables for household food insecurity, household
very low food security, child food insecurity, and child very low food security. Naïve regressions
that control for demographics and year fixed effects produce negative associations between
distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter and several of the food insecurity measures,
suggesting that closer proximity to a Walmart Supercenter actually worsens food insecurity.
Since these associations may reflect underlying differences in population characteristics rather
than causal effects of the stores, we then turn to an instrumental variables (IV) analysis that
utilizes the predictable geographic expansion patterns of Walmart Supercenters outward from
corporate headquarters. Specifically, we instrument for Walmart Supercenters with the
interaction of distance from Bentonville, Arkansas (Walmart’s headquarters) and year. The IV
results show that a greater distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter significantly increases
food insecurity according to all three household measures as well as two of the three child
measures. In other words, after accounting for the endogeneity of Walmart location decisions,
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closer proximity to a Walmart Supercenter improves food security. Subsample analyses reveal
that the effect is especially large for low-income households.
2. Methods
We begin by estimating linear probability models (LPMs) of the form
ln
where

_

1

is the outcome (each of the aforementioned food insecurity variables) for

household i living in census tract c in year t,
the nearest Walmart Supercenter in year t,
year fixed effects (

1 if

,

_

is distance in miles from census tract c to

is a set of J control variables,

is a set of Y

is the error term, and the other Greek letters are

parameters to be estimated.24 Distance from a census tract to the nearest Walmart Supercenter
indicates to what extent residents are exposed to Walmart Supercenters, and therefore
measures the effect of Walmart Supercenters on households’ food insecurity. We take the natural
logarithm of distance since it seems reasonable to expect a diminishing marginal effect. For
instance, if a new Walmart Supercenter reduces a household’s distance to the nearest Walmart
Supercenter from 50 to 40 miles, this is unlikely to matter since both stores are prohibitively far
away. The conclusions reached, however, are the same if we use a linear specification. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, since census tract is the
geographic level at which we measure Walmart Supercenter exposure.
A concern with equation (1) is the possible endogeneity of Supercenter locations.
Omitted variable bias could result if changes over time in unobserved area characteristics
24

In unreported regressions (available upon request), we have verified that the estimated marginal effects are
virtually identical using probit and logit models instead of linear probability models. This is not surprising since
LPMs have been shown to give reliable estimates of average effects (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Section 3.4.2).
We prefer to focus on the LPM estimates since they are easier to implement in the subsequent instrumental variables
regressions.
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influence both the entry of Walmart Supercenters and residents’ levels of food security. We are
able to control for some obvious confounders such as income, but it is difficult to account for all
of them. Reverse causality is also a concern, as big box grocers may specifically target areas
lacking sufficient food supply.
We attempt to overcome these endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variables, or
variables that are strongly correlated with the endogenous store variables but otherwise
uncorrelated with the outcome (food insecurity) variables conditional on the controls. We adopt a
similar strategy used by Courtemanche and Carden (2011) to investigate the impact of Walmart
Supercenters on obesity. This strategy is based on the observation that the pattern of Walmart
Supercenter expansion starting in 1988 was to radiate outward from Walmart’s headquarters in
Bentonville, AR, gradually reaching the entire continental United States by the late 2000s.25 The
expansionary pattern indicates that in the first few years, areas close to northwest Arkansas were
the most likely to experience Walmart Supercenter entry, then in the next few years areas slightly
further away were the most likely to have new Walmart Supercenters. The process continues
until in the later year states on the coasts were the most likely to be exposed to the entry of
Walmart Supercenters. In other words, during our sample period distance from Bentonville
influenced the probability an area experienced Walmart Supercenter entry in a given year, and
this effect changed over time. The interaction of distance from Bentonville with time therefore
serves as a plausibly exogenous instrument that can identify the causal impact of Walmart
Supercenters on food security.26

25

See Courtemanche and Carden (2011) for maps of Supercenters’ expansion over time.
This distance-from-Bentonville identification strategy has also been used by Neumark et al. (2008) and Dube et al.
(2007) in studies of Walmart’s effect on local labor markets. Basker (2006) critiqued the use of this strategy in the
labor market context, but Courtemanche and Carden (2011) conduct a wide array of robustness checks and placebo
tests to verify that Basker’s criticism did not apply to health-related contexts such as obesity.
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Specifically, we divide the U.S. into 17 distance rings reflecting 100-mile increments of
distance from Bentonville (e.g. less than 100 miles, 100-200 miles, …, 1600 or more miles) and
create an indicator variable for each ring.27 The distance ring dummies are included as controls,
while the interactions of the distance ring dummies with year are used as instruments. The
resulting two-stage IV model therefore has the first-stage equation
ln

_

_

_
where

_

∗

2

is the distance from census tract c to Bentonville while

is the error

term. The second-stage regression is
ln

_

_

3

which differs from the naïve regression (1) by replacing the distance to Walmart
Supercenters with the predicted values of this variable estimated in equation (2) and adding the
distance ring fixed effects as controls.
Identification of

in the IV model comes from the assumption that the distance*year

interactions can be excluded from the second-state regression (3) – i.e. that these interactions are
uncorrelated with changes over time in food security conditional on the controls. By including
the distance ring fixed effects in (3), we allow for the distances to be correlated with levels of
food security; we only need to assume that they are uncorrelated with trends. We test the validity

27

The 100-mile distance ring classification follows Neumark et al. (2008) and Dube et al. (2007). In unreported
specifications we found that the results are robust to the use of various other specifications for distance (e.g. linear,
quadratic) and year (e.g. dummies for each year).
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of the identifying assumption by checking the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the
various combinations of control variables and performing the over-identification test.
3. Data
Our source of individual-level data on food security is the Current Population Survey
Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS), an annual household survey conducted by the U.S.
Census Bureau for the USDA. The CPS-FSS is the December supplement to the monthly Current
Population Survey (CPS), which is a nationally representative survey on labor force statistics.
The participants of the CPS-FSS are the same as those interviewed by the original monthly CPS.
In the month when the CPS-FSS is conducted, the participants answer the labor force questions
as well as a series of questions concerning food security, food consumption, and the usage of
food assistance programs. We currently focus on the CPS-FSS from 2001-2007 because we can
match the CPS data with our data on Walmart Supercenters until 2007. However, we expect to
extend the research period in the future since we are still in the process of collecting reliable data
on Walmart Supercenter openings after 2007.
The CPS-FSS includes the standard set of 18 questions that are used to assess household
and child food security. These questions ask whether in the last 12 months: 1) the statement “We
worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more” was often or
sometimes true; 2) the statement “The food that we bought didn’t last and we didn’t have money
to get more” was often or sometimes true; 3) the statement “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced
meals” was often or sometimes true; 4) you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of
meals or skipped meals because there wasn’t enough money for food; 5) #4 happened in more
than two months; 6) you ever ate less than you felt you should because there wasn’t enough
money for food; 7) you were ever hungry but didn’t eat because you couldn’t afford food; 8) you
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lost weight because you didn’t have enough money for food; 9) you or other adults in your
household ever did not eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food; 10) #9
happened in more than two months; 11) the statement “We relied on only a few kinds of lowcost food to feed our children because we were running out of money to buy food” was
sometimes or often true; 12) the statement “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal,
because we couldn’t afford that” was sometimes or often true; 13) the statement “The children
were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food” was sometimes or often
true; 14) you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there wasn’t enough money
for food; 15) the children were ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food; 16) any of
the children ever skipped a meal because there wasn’t enough money for food; 17) #16 happened
in more than two months; and 18) any of the children ever did not eat for a whole day because
there wasn’t enough money for food. Following convention (e.g. Nord et al., 2005), we use six
outcome variables to measure food insecurity. Two of them are continuous variables indicating
the counts of affirmative responses to the above questions for household and children separately.
Another four are dummy variables summarizing the answers to these 18 questions: “household
food insecurity” (three or more “yes” answers), “household very low food security” (eight or
more “yes” answers or six or more in households without children), “child food insecurity” (two
or more “yes” answers on child questions), and “child very low food security” (five or more
“yes” answers on child questions).
We also use the CPS-FSS to construct three sets of individual-level control variables:
demographic characteristics, economic characteristics, and participation in government food
assistance programs. The demographic variables include adult responder’s age; number of own
children (dummies for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+, with 0 as the omitted base category); dummies for
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whether race/ethnicity is non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, or Hispanic (other
race/ethnicity is the omitted category); dummies for married and formerly married (never
married is the omitted category); and dummies for high school degree but no further, some
college, college degree, and graduate degree (less than high school degree is the omitted
category). The economic variables are household income (dummies for the 16 categories given
by the CPS), occupation (dummies for 17 categories), and median income in the census tract.28
The food assistance variables are indicators for whether any household member received
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits; Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC) benefits; and free/reduced-price school breakfasts or lunches in the past year.
We also include county-level food availability variables as control variables in some
regressions. These include numbers of restaurants, grocery stores/supermarkets, convenience
stores, and supercenters/warehouse clubs (subtracting out Walmart Supercenters), obtained from
the United States Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns. We scale these variables by
population (per 100,000 capita) using annual population estimates from the Census Bureau.
Our independent variable of interest is distance from each respondent’s census tract of
residence to the nearest Walmart Supercenter as of the end of each year. Walmart Supercenter
entry dates and locations through 2007 were hand-collected and used in Courtemanche and
Carden (2011, 2014). The census tract geographic data come from the U.S. Census Bureau
Tiger/Line Shapefiles 2000. For each census tract, an internal point, usually a geographic center
of the area, is identified, and its latitude and longitude coordinates are used to label the census
tract. The distance from a census tract to the nearest Walmart Supercenter is then computed
using the geodetic distance between the two sets of corresponding coordinates. The geodetic

28

About 15% of the sample has missing income data. We drop these individuals for the reported regressions, but the
results are very similar if we include them and indicate them with a dummy variable.
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distance measures the length of the shortest arc between two points on the ellipsoid surface of the
earth. The distance from a census tract to the headquarters of Walmart at Bentonville, AR, is
calculated following the same algorithm, then categorized into 17 distance rings.
Merging the CPS-FSS to the census tract-level geographic data and county-level store
variables requires precise geographic identifiers that are not available in the public-use data. We
therefore use the restricted version of the CPS-FSS, provided by the Census Bureau after an
application process and accessed in the Atlanta Census Research Data Center.
Dropping observations with missing data yields a final analysis sample of approximately
236,000 households, 75,000 of which have children. Following Research Data Center disclosure
policies, we are only able to report sample sizes rounded to the nearest 1,000 observations. Table
8 presents the summary statistics for the food security and Walmart variables, both for the full
sample and subsamples that we will consider in our regression analyses: low income households
(<$25,000), households living in MSA central cities, and households living in rural areas.
In the full sample, on average, households affirmatively answer 0.7 questions for the 18item food security module. There are 11 percent of households have experienced food insecurity,
and 2 percent of them have very low food security. Turning to child food insecurity, the situation
is a bit better. On average, children affirmatively answer 0.46 questions of the 18-items. Among
all children, 6 percent of them have food insecurity, and only 0.5 percent of them have very low
food security.
Low income households and children from low income families experience much worse
food insecurity. They affirmatively answer twice as many questions as those in the full sample.
The percentage of food insecurity and very low food security for both households and children
roughly doubled in the low income households sample compared to the full sample. Dividing the
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sample by MSA central cities and rural areas, the food insecurity measures are similar to those of
the full sample.
4. Results
Tables 9-10 report the results for food insecurity outcomes for households as a whole and
for children separately. The first column is for the linear probability model without instruments.
The last five columns are for the full-sample IV regressions, with distance ring from
Bentonville*year as the instruments for distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter. The five
IV columns report from specifications with: 1) only demographic controls, 2) demographic and
economic controls, 3) demographic and food assistance controls, 4) demographic and food
availability controls (warehouse clubs, restaurants, grocery stores/supermarkets, and convenience
stores), and 5) all sets of controls. We experiment with different combinations of control
variables because it is not clear whether it is appropriate to control for the economic, food
assistance, and food availability variables. On one hand, they might help capture unobservable
determinants of both Walmart entry decisions and food insecurity. On the other hand, they could
potentially be endogenous to Walmart presence: Walmart entry could influence local incomes
(which in turn affect eligibility for food assistance programs) as well as other food retailers’
entry and exit decisions. It is therefore important to verify that including these sets of variables
does not meaningfully impact the results.
Table 9 presents the results for household food insecurity. Estimates from the LPM
model demonstrate a significant and negative association between Walmart Supercenters and all
three household food insecurity measures. However, the LPM estimates are unlikely to reflect a
causal effect because of the aforementioned endogeneity problems. We therefore turn to the IV
models. All IV estimates are positive and significant, indicating that the causal effect of having a
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Walmart Supercenter nearby is to reduce the likelihood of being food insecure. Since we use the
natural log of the distance from the nearest Supercenter variable, the coefficient estimates can be
interpreted as the approximate effect of a 100% increase in distance. The IV results therefore
suggest that 100% greater distance from Walmart leads to 0.06-0.08 more affirmative responses
to the household portion of the food insecurity questionnaire, while increasing the rate of
household food insecurity by 0.99-1.2 percentage points and the rate of household very low food
security by 0.52-0.67 percentage points. In Table 9, we also present the first-stage F tests and the
over-identification test p-values as evidence for the validity of the instrument. In all
specifications, the first-stage F statistics are always safely over the rule-of-thumb critical value of
10, which is the conventionally accepted levels for instruments to be considered sufficiently
strong. Moreover, the over-identification tests are insignificant in most specifications, which
suggests that the instruments are appropriate.
The results for child food insecurity, shown in Table 10, are generally similar to those for
household food insecurity. We find negative, though insignificant, correlations between the three
child food insecurity outcomes and distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter. The IV
estimates are positive and significant for count of affirmative child responses and child food
insecurity, indicating that a shorter distance to Walmart Supercenters reduces the likelihood of
children being food insecure. A 100% increase in distance from the nearest Walmart Supercenter
increases the number of affirmative responses to the child portion of the food insecurity
questionnaire by 0.028-0.033 and the probability of a household’s children being food insecure
of 1.3-1.4 percentage points. However, the IV estimates are small and insignificant for the third
child outcome: child very low food security. We suspect that this is because child very low food
security is an extreme condition that applies to a very small portion of our sample (under 1%).
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For all outcomes, the results are robust if we add the economic, food assistance programs, and
county food availability controls. The first-stage F statistics are again larger than 10 and the
over-identification tests are insignificant in most specifications, both indicating that the
instrument performs well.
Table 11 reports for subsamples for which we hypothesize the effects of Walmart on food
security might be particularly strong: low-income households (<$25,000), households living in
MSA central cities, and households living in rural areas. Low income households might be
particularly sensitive to the reduction in food prices brought about by Walmart entry. Walmart
Supercenters are also likely to improve food security in areas with relatively little food
availability, as households in these areas experience large reductions in the time cost of obtaining
food. In this version of the paper, we proxy for low food availability areas by examining
subsamples of MSA central cities and rural areas, the two types of locations most commonly
alleged to be food deserts. The first column of Table 11 simply reprints the estimates from the
full sample IV regressions for comparison purposes. By restricting the sample to low income
households, we again find positive and significant effects of Walmart Supercenters, and the
effects are substantially larger than those from the full sample. The results for the subsamples of
households in MSA central cities and rural areas are mixed. The estimates are larger than those
from the full sample in some specifications while smaller in others, and they are fairly imprecise.
In future versions of the paper, we will attempt to improve on this portion of the analysis by
identifying the exact census tracts designated as food deserts by the USDA and running
subsample regressions for households in these areas.
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5. Conclusion
This paper asks whether Walmart Supercenters, which lower food prices and expand food
availability, improve food security. We estimate instrumental variables (IV) models that exploit
the predictable geographic expansion patterns of Walmart Supercenters outward from corporate
headquarter. Our results rely on data from the restricted-access 2001-2007 waves of the
December CPS Food Security Supplement. These data allow us to investigate the impact of
Walmart Supercenters on households’ and children’s food insecurity at the census tract-level.
We find that the entry of Walmart Supercenters helps to alleviate food insecurity for both
households and children. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for households’
economic status, food assistance program participation, and county food availability.
Our finding contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, we provide new evidence
on the causes of food insecurity. Considerable resources are allocated through food assistance
programs toward protecting households, especially children, from food insecurity. However, no
research to date has examined the influence of big box grocers on food insecurity. Second, we
contribute to the debate about Walmart’s health effects. Big box grocers, Walmart Supercenters
in particular, are blamed for causing obesity (Courtemanche and Carden, 2011; Courtemanche et
al., 2015). However, we are the first to study the other side of the coin: how the same cheap and
readily available food that drives big box grocers’ effect on obesity may also help in fighting
food insecurity. This improvement in food security adds another factor local governments should
consider when deciding whether to use policy levers (e.g. taxes, zoning laws) to either
incentivize or prevent entry from bog box stores.
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6. Tables
Table 8 Summary Statistics for Key Variables

Count of affirmative household responses
Household food insecurity
Household very low food security
Count of affirmative child responses
Child food insecurity
Child very low food security

Full
sample
0.71
(1.93)
0.11
(0.31)
0.02
(0.15)
0.46
(0.81)
0.06
(0.24)
0.005

Low-income
households
1.65
(2.77)
0.25
(0.43)
0.06
(0.23)
0.88
(0.19)
0.16
(0.36)
0.01

MSA central
cities
0.7
(1.94)
0.11
(0.31)
0.02
(0.15)
0.45
(0.82)
0.06
(0.24)
0.005

Rural
areas
0.74
(1.93)
0.11
(0.31)
0.02
(0.15)
0.48
0.78
0.06
(0.24)
0.004

(0.07)

(0.12)

(0.07)

(0.06)
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Table 9 Regression Results for Household Food Insecurity Outcomes
LPM
(1)

(2)

(3)

Instrumental Variables
(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.027***

0.073***

0.07***

0.062***

0.078***

0.065***

(0.005)

(0.025)

(0.023)

(0.023)

(0.025)

(0.0022)

First Stage F Statistic

--

133

134

133

130

130

Over-identification Test P-Value

--

0.13

0.47

0.094

0.11

0.27

-0.004***

0.012***

0.011****

0.0099***

0.012***

0.01***

(0.0008)

(0.0039)

(0.0037)

(0.0037)

(0.004)

(0.0036)

First Stage F Statistic

--

133

134

133

130

130

Over-identification Test P-Value

--

0.22

0.59

0.27

0.19

0.55

-00018***

0.0059***

0.0054**

0.0052**

0.0067***

0.0055**

(0.0005)

(0.0023)

(0.0022)

(0.0022)

(0.0023)

(0.0022)

First Stage F Statistic

--

133

134

133

130

130

Over-identification Test P-Value

--

0.22

0.43

0.17

0.22

0.35

Demographic Controls

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Economic Controls

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

Food Assistance Controls

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

County Food Availability Controls

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

Distance Ring Fixed Effects

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Count of Affirmative Household Responses
ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter)

Household Food Insecurity
ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter)

Household Very Low Food Security
ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter)

Year Fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. CPS household sampling weights are used. Sample size is approximately 236,000.
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Table 10 Regression Results for Child Food Insecurity Outcomes
LPM
(1)

(2)

(3)

Instrumental Variables
(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.007**

0.033**

0.032**

0.03**

0.033**

0.028*

(0.0034)

(0.016)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.015)

First Stage F Statistic

--

100

101

100

94

95

Overidentification Test P-Value

--

0.018

0.072

0.063

0.017

0.098

-0.0012

0.014***

0.014***

0.013***

0.014***

0.013***

(0.0011)

(0.0052)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.0052)

(0.005)

First Stage F Statistic

--

100

101

100

94

95

Overidentification Test P-Value

--

0.034

0.081

0.095

0.031

0.11

-0.0003

0.0005

0.0004

0.0004

0.0004

0.0002

(0.0003)

(0.0014)

(0.0014)

(0.0014)

(0.0014)

(0.0014)

First Stage F Statistic

--

100

101

100

94

95

Overidentification Test P-Value

--

0.81

0.87

0.81

0.82

0.85

Demographic Controls

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Economic Controls

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

Food Assistance Controls

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

County Food Availability Controls

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

Distance Ring Fixed Effects

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Count of Affirmative Child Responses
ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter)

Child Food Insecurity
ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter)

Child Very Low Food Security
ln(Distance to Walmart Supercenter)

Year Fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. CPS household sampling weights are used. Sample size is approximately 75,000.
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Table 11 Subsample Regression Results
Full Sample
Count of Affirmative Household Responses
ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter)
Household Food Insecurity
ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter)
Household Very Low Food Security
ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter)
Number of Observations
Count of Affirmative Child Responses
ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter)
Child Food Insecurity
ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter)
Child Very Low Food Security
ln(Distance to Nearest Walmart Supercenter)
Number of Observations

Income < $25,000

Subsamples of Interest
MSA Central City

Rural Area

0.07***
(0.023)

0.17***
(0.06)

0.051
(0.042)

0.07
(0.063)

0.011****
(0.0037)

0.03***
(0.0093)

0.011*
(0.0067)

0.0058
(0.0097)

0.0054**
(0.0022)
236,000

0.014**
(0.0064)
70,000

0.0055
(0.0043)
68,000

0.012*
(0.0066)
61,000

0.032**
(0.015)

0.063
(0.045)

0.01
(0.029)

0.034
(0.046)

0.014***
(0.005)

0.027*
(0.015)

0.0032
(0.0098)

0.012
(0.015)

0.0004
(0.0014)
75,000

0.0001
(0.0046)
17,000

0.001
(0.0028)
20,000

0.0048
(0.0042)
19,000

Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by census tract, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. CPS household sampling weights are used. All regressions include demographic and economic controls and
distance ring and year fixed effect
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CHAPTER III: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT USING LABOR MARKET FLOWS
1. Introduction
Workplace-mandated maternity benefits are essential to support working mothers in order
to maintain a continuous labor supply. In the U.S., the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is
such a federal policy mandating the provision of maternity leave to covered employees. The
FMLA was legislated in February 1993 and went into effect in August 1993. Under the FMLA,
eligible employees in establishments with 50 or more employees are entitled to take up to twelve
weeks of unpaid yet job-protected leaves for health related issues, and, most importantly, for the
birth and care of newborns.29
Despite the fact that FMLA leaves are unpaid and subject to a rigorous application
process,30 they have been broadly used since its legislation. According to the 2000 FMLA survey
report,31 16.5% of all employees in the U.S., 23.8 million, had taken FMLA leaves in the 18
months prior to the survey. Both male and female workers are entitled to FMLA leaves. Among
eligible leave-takers, 57.7% were women and 42.3% were men. However, females (75.8%) with
children under age 18 were significantly more likely than males with young children (45.1%) to
take leaves. In addition, 42.8% of female leave-takers took maternity disability, for which only
female employees are eligible. Maternity leave was also the longest among all the types of leaves.
While most leaves were short-term (83.3% of leaves lasted less than ten days), 68.4% of
maternity leaves lasted for more than 30 days.

29

Detailed benefits are provided on this website: http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/
To apply for FMLA leaves, an employee has to fulfill these requirements (not exhaustive): The employee has
worked for the employer for at least one year and 1,250 hours or more; the employer is an establishment with 50 or
more employees within a geographic radius of 75 miles; and the employee has to inform the employer at least 30
days in advance.
31
The full report is available on this website: http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/toc.htm
30
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Proponents of maternity leave legislation believe that the FMLA could “promote the goal
of equal employment opportunity for women and men” (The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993: Public Law 103-3, 107 Stat. 6-7). However, like any policy designed to ease work-family
conflicts, the FMLA might have unexpected effects. Economic analyses indicate that the costs of
providing maternity leave will be largely borne by those who most value the benefits (Summers,
1989). In the case of the FMLA, the principal “costs” are disruption costs to employers due to
worker leaves. Leave taking disturbs production routine, requires temporary replacement hiring,
and adds uncertainty since there might be a chance that leave-takers won’t return. These costs
shift downward the labor demand curve for young women as they are most likely to benefit
directly from maternity leave. Because labor supply is generally more inelastic than labor
demand, the costs of the mandate are likely to be shifted to women of childbearing age, either in
the form of lower wages or as a reduction in employment if wages are rigid.
In this paper, I take the legislation of the FMLA as a natural experiment and examine its
impact on young women’s labor market outcomes. The identification of the treatment effect is
three-fold. The first source of variation comes from the difference between the pre- and the postFMLA periods. The second source lies in the fact that some states passed state-level maternity
leave mandates before 1993, while others did not. Therefore, the FMLA should have a greater
impact on states without a prior maternity leave policy than on states with a mandate in place
before the federal FMLA. The third source of variation arises because women of childbearing
age differ from other workers in that they are eligible for maternity leave. Employees can take
FMLA leaves due to various types of health-related reasons. While other types of leaves are
extended to all workers, maternity leave is a group-specific benefit that applies only to women.
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Therefore, I expect that the FMLA would have larger effect on women of childbearing age.
These variations enable me to adopt a triple-difference (DDD) method.
The novel feature of this study is that I use six labor market outcomes, including
employment and wages, new hires and starting salaries, as well as job separations and recalls.
Previous studies on this topic focus predominantly on how the policy change affects employment
and wages. However, such stock variables consist mostly of existing workers, and thus, are
unlikely to adjust instantly at the time that the FMLA was legislated. It takes time for the labor
market to develop a new equilibrium level. I seek to improve upon the literature by using flow
variables, i.e., hiring, separations and recalls. Firms’ hiring decisions are more flexible, and thus
might change instantly when the FMLA was enacted. Separations evaluate how the FMLA
influences work tenure. Recalls were once widespread in the U.S., particularly in the industrial
and unionized sectors of the economy, with 70% of workers temporarily laid off being rehired by
their former employers (Katz and Meyer, 1990). Temporary layoffs and recalls are far less likely
today. That said, temporary leaves of absence, common among child-bearing women, and other
labor market flows reflect the dynamics of the labor market, and therefore may help one
understands the immediate causal effects of the FMLA.
To conduct the analysis, I use data from a relatively new data set, the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI). This publicly accessible data set contains rich information on labor
force measurements, including the six labor market outcomes. It also has almost universal
coverage on employment in the private sector. Using the QWI data and applying the tripledifference method, I obtain little evidence that the FMLA reduces the starting salaries offered to
young women and increases recalls among them when using older women as the comparison
group. When compared with young men, the FMLA has no significant effect on any labor
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market outcomes. However, I am unable to determine whether the lack of evidence indicates a
true zero effect or if it is due to imprecise estimation and relatively uninformative data.
2. Previous Literature
The FMLA is the first federal mandate in the U.S. that requires the provision of
maternity leave benefits among covered establishments. Since its legislation, the FMLA has
generated a far-reaching effect on society. Both male and female employees take advantage of
the policy, while working mothers are more likely to take leaves or take longer leaves than
working fathers (Berger and Waldfogel, 2004; Han, Ruhm, and Waldfogel, 2009; Han and
Waldfogel, 2003). Research exploring the consequences of the FMLA generally find that it
encourages the fertility rate among working women (Averett and Whittington, 2001; Rossin,
2011); promotes breastfeeding (Berger, Hill and Waldfogel, 2005); improves infants’ health
(Rossin, 2011); and enhances new mothers’ mental and physical health (Chatterji and
Markowitz, 2012; Chatterji et al., 2013).
Several studies have examined the effects of the FMLA on employment and wages, but
they have reached no consensus. Waldfogel (1999) uses the variations generated from the
passing points of state maternity leave laws and the federal FMLA as a natural experiment to
estimate the effects of the FMLA. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), she
finds that the FMLA has no significant impact on women’s employment or wages. Using data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), Baum (2003)
improves the estimation by identifying whether women work for establishments that are large
enough to fulfill the FMLA’s coverage requirements. He also finds insignificant effects of the
FMLA on both employment and wages.
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Another study by Espinola-Arredondo and Mondal (2009) examines the impact of the
FMLA while taking into account a related policy--Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI). They
compare the effect of the FMLA in states with TDI and those without. Their findings suggest
that the FMLA significantly increases female employment. Observing the declining labor force
participation rate among mothers with infants, Goodpaster (2010) analyzes whether the FMLA
has an impact on women’s labor force participation. She finds that almost two-thirds of the
reduction in labor force participation among new mothers in the mid-1990s can be explained by
the legislation of the FMLA. To examine the gender-wage gap, Manchester et al. (2008) use the
FMLA as a policy shock to work commitment. They find a negative impact of maternity leave
usage on women’s wages, which suggests that firms either discriminate or have expectations of
lower job commitment and productivity for young women. Thomas (2014) suggests that women
are more likely to remain employed after the legislation of the FMLA, but at the same time, they
are also less likely to be promoted.
Previous studies provide little knowledge on the effects of workplace mandates, mainly
because we generally do not have much information to measure the effects in a precise way.
Almost all of the literature of the FMLA focuses on how the policy change affects women’s
employment and wages. This study is innovative in the sense that I explore the immediate
impacts of the FMLA on labor market flows, including hires and starting salaries, as well as
separations and recalls. While it takes time for employment and wages to adjust to a new
equilibrium level, firms have flexible control on hiring decisions. Intuitively, if firms believe that
the FMLA imposes a cost of hiring young women, they may adjust hiring decisions accordingly.
On the other hand, if such family benefit attracts young women to join the labor force, the firms
may be more likely to hire young women as the pool of candidates is larger. Job separations may
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also be affected by the FMLA. Now that employees have the option to take leaves when
necessary, the policy may enhance job commitment among young women. Yet, firms might be
more likely to lay off potential leave-takers. The last outcome, recalls, refers to rehired workers
who are temporarily laid off or on a lengthy leave by the same employer. The FMLA might
affect recalls if choices by the firm or the employee result in lengthy leave-taking (consecutive
quarters off the payroll in the QWI), followed by a return to work (returning to an
establishment’s payroll), defined as a recall in the QWI.
The QWI not only provides the labor measures needed for this investigation, but also
empowers the generalizability of study results since it has universal coverage of private
establishments. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that utilizes labor market flow
measurements to identify the causal effects of the FMLA on women’s labor market outcomes.32 I
consider the analysis in this paper a complement to the existing studies. In addition, the hires and
separations measurements can be applied to broad research questions concerning the effects of
policies that change labor demand and supply.
3. Data
I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators to estimate the effects of the FMLA on young
women’s labor market outcomes. QWI is a publicly available dataset that contains rich
information, collected quarterly, on labor force measures at local levels. This data set is based on
a wide variety of employment records, such as unemployment insurance data, social security
data, federal tax records, etc. From these data sources, individual-level data are linked to firm
information, then further aggregated based on locations, quarters, and demographic categories.
Within each geographic location, the data are divided into 16 data cells corresponding to 16 sex-

32

Curtis et al. (2014) use the QWI to examine the effects of California’s 2004 paid family leave policy on new hire
earnings, employment, separations, and recalls.
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age groups.33 Therefore, the level of observation is at the sex and age group-county-quarter level.
For example, a single data cell may represent an employment measurement for workers who are
females aged 25-34 and employed in establishments in a particular county in certain quarter of
the year.
There are at least three advantages of using QWI data to investigate the current research
question. First, QWI data have almost universal coverage on employment statewide. The data
cover 98% of all private sector employment in non-agricultural industries. Second, QWI contains
various labor supply measurements, including labor market flows that are at the heart of this
study. Last but not least, although QWI data are aggregated, they are detailed enough to let me
identify the demographic groups that might be affected most by the FMLA, i.e., women of
childbearing age. Hence, I can determine the causal effects of the FMLA by comparing labor
market outcomes between young women and other workers.
Two limitations of the QWI are that it fails to measure either employer size or hours of
work. Because the FMLA covers only those employees with least one year of job tenure and
work in establishments with 50+ employees (roughly 58 percent of all employees), estimates of
FMLA effects from the QWI are likely to be seriously attenuated. Although the QWI measures
quarterly earnings, the inability to measure hours makes it difficult to distinguish differences in
wages from differences in hours worked.
An additional shortcoming of the data available in the QWI is that it relies on the
voluntary participation of individual states, and only six states reported information in QWI in
the early 1990s. They are California (CA), Idaho (ID), Maryland (MD), Oregon (OR),
Washington (WA), and Wisconsin (WI). Despite this limitation, the six states still provide a fair
amount of variations because they differ in terms of the passing dates of maternity leave benefits.
33

By each gender, there are eight age groups: 14-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65-99 years old.
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Table 12 presents the legislation dates for each of the six states. Among them, four states, CA,
OR, WA and WI, had state-level mandated maternity leave before 1993. The remaining two, ID
and MD, had no such policy prior to the legislation of the federal FMLA. Therefore, we would
expect that when the FMLA was enacted in 1993, the former four states would have been
impacted less than the latter two. For convenience, we refer to the former four states as the nonexperimental states and the latter two as the experimental states.
The six states started to participate in QWI at different times. Therefore, instead of
restricting the study to a fixed research period, I include all the information available before 1996.
The cutoff is set at 1996 to avoid the confounding factors induced by the legislation of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (i.e., so-called welfare
reform), which had a profound impact on employment among women in low-income households.
Table 13 shows the data periods for each state. Among the six states, MD, WA and WI have the
longest data history while CA has the shortest.
I measure the impact of the FMLA on three sets of outcome variables. The first set of
outcomes, employment and monthly wages (i.e., earnings), makes up a standard labor market
measurement used in most labor studies. In QWI, these measurements are assessed as the
number of employed workers and the corresponding monthly wage. One limitation of such
measures is that they consist of a stock of existing workers. Thus, the effects of policy change on
employment and wages are unlikely to occur instantly, but instead to develop gradually as the
labor market moves toward a new equilibrium. For this reason, I focus on another two sets of
outcomes that specify labor market flows.
The second set of outcomes, the number of newly hired workers and the associated
monthly starting salaries, reflects the flow of employment. Firms have relatively flexible control
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over hiring decisions. If they believe that the mandate imposes a cost of hiring women of
childbearing age, such as the cost of temporarily replacing leave-takers and the cost of providing
health insurance for leave-takers, firms might adjust their hiring decisions accordingly. For
example, firms might avoid hiring young women or incorporate a “wage penalty” into the
starting salaries that are offered to young females. On the other hand, if the availability of the
maternity leave attracts women whose labor supply might otherwise be constrained by binding
family responsibilities, the firms will have a larger pool of candidates. Thus, firms might end up
hiring more women of childbearing age, albeit at lower salaries. As previously stated, the QWI
does not provide measures of hours worked, hence, the employment wages and starting salaries
are measured by monthly rather than average hourly rates.
The third set of variables also are flows, includes the number of workers separated from
jobs and the number of workers recalled by the original employers. These variables are
interesting because it is not unusual that pregnant women and new mothers leave jobs,
voluntarily or non-voluntarily, absent maternity leave benefits and/or job protection. Since the
most important feature of the FMLA is job-protection, the policy might reduce job separation
among young women. However, it may also be true that the FMLA might lead to leave-takers
deciding to quit jobs after taking family leave if they value staying at home more than working.
The outcomes, job separations possibly accompanied by eventual recalls (rehires), provides
insight into the effects of the FMLA.
I restrict employment, new hires, and separations to be “stable” measurements that last
for at least a whole quarter. This simple yet essential step mitigates the influence of seasonal and
temporary change in employment which might confound the results. The new hire measurement
differs from recalls in the sense that recalls refer to workers that are rehired by the original
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employers while new hires include workers that were not employed by the same firms in the past
four quarters. The labor market flows, new hires, separations, and recalls, are particularly
suitable in the case of capturing the immediate impact of the policy change on labor demand and
supply.
I use the natural logarithm form for all of the outcome variables, and I add one to each
value before taking logs in order to avoid extreme outliers when the original value is zero. Table
14 presents the summary statistics for outcomes before taking logarithms. The unit of
observation is at the demographic group-location-quarter level. Overall, there are 19 quarters, 9
sex-and-age groups, and 273 counties. In the most narrowly defined data cells, i.e., observations
based on few persons or establishments, the data are suppressed as missing values for
confidentiality reasons. Such suppression only applies to counts, such as new hires, but not to
continuous variables, such as the starting salaries.
I divide the sample into three subgroups, one treatment group and two control groups.
The treatment group includes women of childbearing age (aged 19-34). Their close counterparts
are young men aged 19 to 34, who make up one of the control groups. I refer to the treatment
group as “young women” and their male counterparts as “young men”. I also use a second
control group, called “older women”, which contains female workers aged 35-64. The summary
statistics of the three subgroups are listed in panel A, B, and C.
Comparing across the three subgroups, the employment and monthly wages of young
women are consistently less than that of young men and older women. On average, there are less
newly hired young women than young men, but there are more newly hired young women than
older women. The starting salaries for young women are lower than that of both young men and
older women. The number of separations for young women is smaller than that of young men,
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but larger than that of older women. There are fewer young women being recalled compared to
young men and older women.
In the comparison between non-experimental states and experimental states, the former
have more observations because they include more states. Wages and starting salaries of young
women in experimental states are slightly lower than that of young women in non-experimental
states. However, wages and starting salaries of young men in experimental states are higher than
that of their counterparts in non-experimental states. For older women, they have higher wages in
non-experimental states, but newly hired older women receive higher starting salaries in
experimental states. The numbers of employment, new hires, and separations for the three
subgroups are larger in non-experimental states. The numbers of recalls for young women and
older women are lowers in non-experimental states but higher for young men in nonexperimental states.
The six graphs in Figure 1 show the ratio of each outcome variable of the treated group to
one of the two control groups, separated by experiment states, “exp”, and non-experimental
states, “non-exp”. For example, the first curve in the first graph represents the ratio of
employment of young women to young men in experimental states. These six graphs present the
following evidence. First, while both new hires and employment fluctuate seasonally, the
fluctuation in new hires is much more substantial than in employment. Second, the ratios of
employment and new hires of young women to older women decline during the research period.
Third, the ratios of the starting salaries of young women to the two control groups in nonexperimental states peaked at the time the FMLA was legislated. There is no such pattern in
experimental states.
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4. Empirical Analysis
I take advantage of the legislation of the FMLA as a natural experiment to estimate its
effects on young women’s labor market outcomes. I begin the analysis by setting up a differencein-difference (DD) model that uses two sources of variations-- time and geographic variations.
The 1993 FMLA requires firms to provide maternity leave to eligible employees. Since some
states had state-level maternity leave mandates before 1993 while others did not, I expect that the
FMLA would have larger impacts on the latter states. Using such variations, the DD model
identifies the difference between the changes in outcomes among young women for the
experimental states and the non-experimental states before and after the 1993 FMLA. The
sample is restricted to women of childbearing age, including those aged 19-34. The regression
equation is as follows:
ln
The subscript g denotes each county, and t indicates each quarter-year.

, and

are sets of dummies representing quarter-year fixed effects and county fixed effects.
is the policy variable which equals one if employees work in experimental states after
1993.

is the coefficient in interest which measures the effect of the FMLA.
The DD estimates provide a baseline for the analysis. It allows a simple comparison for

changes in labor outcomes for young women following passage of the FMLA in experimental
states with young women in non-experimental (non-affected) states. However, the FMLA
variable will not only capture the effects of the policy change, but also pick up labor market
effects not controlled for but that are correlated with the adoption of the FMLA. Therefore, it
may be preferable to include employees that do not use maternity leave benefits as the
comparison group, and thus controls for labor market changes for young women as compared to
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other workers that are not due to the FMLA. The difference between the treatment group and the
control groups provide the third source of variation for a standard triple difference model.
ln

∗

∗

The subscript d denotes each sex-age groups, and

∗

are sets of dummies

representing 16 sex-age groups. The inclusion of the three pair-wise intersections among quarteryears, locations, and sex-age groups capture unobserved factors that might confound the causal
effect of the policy change.

, is the policy variable which equals one for women aged

19-34 and work in experimental states after 1993.

is the coefficient of interest that measures

the effect of the FMLA.
The inclusion of these fixed effects controls for factors that vary across sex-age groups,
counties, and quarter-years. For example, the interactions of demographic and county fixed
effects capture the time invariant characteristics for workers in certain county, such as education,
family structure, etc. If these characteristics vary across time, the interactions of quarter and
county fixed effects or the interactions of demographic and quarter fixed effects are likely to pick
up the changes.
5. Results
I present the DD estimates in Table 15. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
state level. The sample is restricted to women of childbearing age. The DD estimates compare
the treatment effect of the FMLA on young women work in experimental states and nonexperimental states. The FMLA has a positive and insignificant effect on employment and new
hires, while it has a negative and insignificant effect on wages of employment and starting
salaries of hires. In addition, the FMLA has negative and insignificant effects on both separations
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and recalls. It is a little surprising that the FMLA reduces separations while increases new hires.
Intuitively, more separations imply more vacant positions and job openings, which result in more
hires. In figure 2, I depict the trends of new hires and separations along the research period. Both
variables are averaged by quarter. As expected, the trends of these two labor market outcomes
generally move coordinately.
The DD estimates only provide simple comparison between female workers in
experimental states and non-experimental states. It is unlikely that the DD estimates reflect the
causal effect of the FMLA because factors that are correlated with employment in experimental
states after 1993 might confound the results. Therefore, I next turn to the triple difference
estimates to explore the causal effect of the policy change on young women’s labor outcomes.
Table 16 presents the estimates from the DDD model. Again, standard errors are
clustered at the state level. The upper panel uses young men as the control group, while the lower
panel uses older women as comparison. When using young men as the control group, I observe
no evidence that the FMLA affects any of the labor market outcomes. The estimates for new
hires and employment are negative yet insignificant, while the estimates for wages and starting
salaries are positive and still insignificant. In addition, the FMLA has a positive and insignificant
effect on separations, and it has a negative still insignificant effect on recalls. Although none of
the estimates are statistically significant, it is not clear that the insignificant effects indicate true
zero effects or are simply due to insufficient precision. Taking the number of new hires as an
example, the point estimate is small and the standard error is six times the coefficient size.
Therefore, with 95% confidence the true effect could lie in an interval between -0.038 and 0.032.
Using older women as the control group, I again observe insignificant effects for most of
the labor market outcomes. However, I find evidence that the legislation of the FMLA reduces
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the starting salaries offered to young women by 2.5 percentage points. In addition, the estimate
for recalls is positive and significant, indicating that the policy change increases recalls for
young women by 3.9 percentage points. Comparing between panel A and panel B, half of the
estimates flip signs when using different control groups. The magnitudes of coefficients and the
associated standard errors also vary by using different comparison groups. The differences are
likely due to imprecise estimation. I do not have strong priors as to which of the control groups is
better suited for this research question.
The idea of using labor market flows to measure the immediate impact of a policy change
is desirable. However, most data sets available do not provide the information needed for such
research design. The QWI contains labor market flow variables and was expected to be the most
suitable data set among current available data. Unfortunately, it is not sufficiently powerful to
produce informative results.
6. Robustness check
To test the robustness of results, I replicate the triple difference estimates with falsified
policy variables. In particular, I first remove the true experimental states, Idaho and Maryland,
from the sample, and arbitrarily designate Wisconsin as the placebo experimental state. The
remaining three, California, Oregon, and Washington, form the non-experimental states. The
choice of states bundled together is based on geography and group size34. These placebo
estimates are shown in Table 17.
As expected, the placebo policy tests provide noisy estimate results. The magnitude of
the estimates are sometimes much larger and sometimes much smaller than the original DDD
results. Half of the estimates are significant. In addition, most coefficients have difference signs

34

Wisconsin has 12,172 observations, which is almost one third of the overall sample size.
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compared to the original DDD estimates. The evidence suggests that the sample or the empirical
approach may not be sufficient to provide reliable estimates for the impact of the FMLA.
7. Conclusion
Workplace mandated benefits are typically designed to help workers and/or mitigate
market failures in the workplace (Summers 1989). However, nonwage benefits might have
consequences on employment and wages, both predictable and unintended, due to the costs of
providing them. Empirical examination of the effects of mandated benefits is difficult because
most data sets available are incapable of identifying small and immediate changes for labor
demand and supply. Existing studies on such topics usually use the Current Population Survey,
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and the Decennial Census data. However, these data
sets either have small individual-level sample sizes or have a prolonged interval between waves.
In addition to data limitations, a more fundamental issue is that employment and wages respond
to policy change gradually. Therefore, the literature provides limited knowledge on the effects of
mandated benefit on labor market outcomes.
This paper seeks to investigate the effects of the FMLA on young women’s labor market
outcomes using data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. I pay particular attention to the
immediate impact of the policy change that is measured by labor market flows, including the
number of new hires and the starting salaries, as well as the numbers of job separations and
recalls. Unlike stock variables such as employment and wages, labor market flows reflect the
immediate changes in labor demand and supply, thus they are potentially more informative
measuring the effects of the FMLA. In triple difference estimations with young men as the
control group, I find no evidence that the FMLA has a significant effect on young women’s labor
market outcomes. When using older women as the comparison group, I find significant evidence
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that the policy reduces the starting salaries offered to young women, and it increases recalls
among them. Using young men as the comparison group provided very different results. And a
placebo test produced coefficients and levels of significance that were as large or larger than the
FMLA results.
The impreciseness and inconsistency of evidence is likely due to insufficient detailed data
and the small number of “treated” groups coupled with a relatively small number of untreated
control states. Although the QWI contains labor market flow variables, it has several
shortcomings that hinder precise estimation. As in early 1990s, only six states reported
information in the QWI, and two small states, ID and MD, form the group of experimental states.
The pre-FMLA period is also short. As shown in Table 13, the earliest data are recorded in the
second quarter of 1991, which is only nine quarters before the legislation of the FMLA. In
addition, it is impossible to exclude workers from establishments uncovered by the FMLA. The
QWI data set has no information on firm size, which is a crucial criterion for FMLA coverage.
Moreover, the QWI payroll variables are averaged monthly but not hourly. Thus, worker and
employer decisions on working hours independent of the FMLA might affect hiring and starting
salaries.
Despite the inherent deficiencies in the analysis, my approach is of some importance in
various ways. For policy purposes, it is necessary to examine how workplace mandates affect
labor market outcomes. Understanding the effects of past policies, such as the FMLA, provides
insights into policies that are currently under discussion, such as paid maternity leave programs
and the extension of the current FMLA. In addition, the idea of using labor market flows to
capture the immediate impact of a policy change can be applied to estimating the effects of a
broad range of mandates that shift labor demand and supply.
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8. Tables and figures
Table 12 Maternal Leave Legislation by individual states
State
California
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin
Idaho
Maryland

Weeks of Leaves
17
12
12
6
12
12

Level
State
State
State
State
Federal
Federal

Data source: Baum (2003).

Table 13 Data periods by states.

California
Idaho
Maryland
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin

Data period
1992Q4-1995Q4
1992Q2-1995Q4
1991Q2-1995Q4
1992Q2-1995Q4
1991Q2-1995Q4
1991Q2-1995Q4
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Date of Enforcement
Jan. 1992
Jan. 1988
Sept. 1989
Apr. 1988
Aug. 1993
Aug. 1993

Table 14 Summary statistics for labor market outcomes

Variables
Obs.
Mean
Panel A: treatment group -young women
Non-Experimental
States
Employment
10151
3548
Employment wage
10189
997
New hires
9981
456
Starting salaries
10080
801
Separations
9975
490
Recalls
9672
159
Panel B: control group 1 -young men
Non-Experimental
States
Employment
10179
4244
Employment wage
10197
1476
New hires
9980
531
Starting salaries
10110
1172
Separations
10013
569
Recalls
9793
240
Panel C: control group 2 -older women
Non-Experimental
States
Employment
10206
4554
Employment wage
10209
1389
New hires
9913
305
Starting salaries
10086
894
Separations
10012
383
Recalls
9705
165

Std. Dev

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev

16571
428
1799
832
2022
613

Experimental
States
3297
1851
3329
970
3145
250
3217
795
3162
312
3033
171

5460
343
607
257
842
508

21138
509
2255
360
2506
929

Experimental
States
3333
2012
3301
1491
3201
269
3222
1218
3205
336
3114
199

5848
520
674
411
915
566

17724
383
1230
293
1551
644

Experimental
States
3345
2302
3348
1319
3093
160
3206
911
3156
260
3083
182

5619
371
396
336
659
495
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Table 15 Double difference estimates of the effects of the FMLA on young women.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ln(NH) Ln(NH salaries) Ln(separation) Ln(recalls)
Ln(emp.) Ln(wages)
FMLA
0.0105
-0.00935
-0.0719
-0.0951
0.0147
-0.0113
(0.0143)
(0.0152)
(0.0853)
(0.0893)
(0.0401)
(0.0219)
Obs.
13,126
13,297
13,137
12,705
13,137
12,705
R-squared
0.923
0.337
0.917
0.872
0.872
0.275
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at state level. Sample are
restricted to young women aged 19-34. To save space, I use abbreviations for some the outcomes. NH
stands for new hires, NH salaries stands for starting salaries for new hires, and emp. for employment.

Table 16 Triple difference estimates of the causal effect of the FMLA on young women.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ln(NH)
Ln(NH salaries) Ln(separations) Ln(recalls) Ln(emp.) Ln(wages)
Control 1- young men
FMLA
-0.00303
0.00217
0.00605
-0.0203
-0.00180
0.0113
(0.0178)
(0.00897)
(0.0304)
(0.0244)
(0.0181) (0.00605)
Obs.
26,307
26,629
26,355
25,612
26,960
27,016
R-squared
0.991
0.847
0.991
0.979
0.998
0.954
Control 2- older women
FMLA
-0.0510
-0.0247**
0.0615
0.0392***
0.00494
0.000587
(0.0305)
(0.00810)
(0.0352)
(0.00518)
(0.0474)
(0.0220)
Obs.
26,132
26,589
26,305
25,493
26,999
27,075
R-squared
0.989
0.721
0.990
0.978
0.998
0.951
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at state level. The
treatment group consists young women aged 19-34. The upper panel uses young men aged 19-34 as the
control group, while the lower panel uses older women aged 35-64 as the comparison. Estimations
include quarter fixed effects, county fixed effects, demographic fixed effects, and the pairwise interaction
among them. To save space, I use abbreviations for some the outcomes. NH stands for new hires, NH
salaries stands for starting salaries for new hires, and emp. for employment.
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Table 17 Triple difference estimates of the effect of the FMLA from state group placebo policies
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ln(NH)
Ln(NH salaries) Ln(separations) Ln(recalls) Ln(emp) Ln(wages)
Control 1- young men
FMLA
-0.0314
-0.00974*
-0.0710***
0.00500
-0.0528** -0.00656
(0.0282)
(0.00392)
(0.00532)
(0.0144)
(0.0146)
(0.0100)
Obs.
19,961
20,190
19,988
19,465
20,330
20,386
R-squared
0.992
0.855
0.991
0.979
0.998
0.956
Control 2- old women
FMLA
-0.0550**
0.00726
-0.0423
-0.0103
-0.0525**
0.0232*
(0.0137)
(0.00647)
(0.0274)
(0.00799)
(0.0157)
(0.00816)
Obs.
19,894
20,166
19,987
19,377
20,357
20,398
R-squared
0.990
0.734
0.990
0.977
0.999
0.953
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at state level. The placebo
tests replace the experimental states with Wisconsin, while the non-experimental states include California,
Oregon, and Washington. Estimations include quarter fixed effects, county fixed effects, demographic
fixed effects, and the pairwise interaction among them. To save space, I use abbreviations for some the
outcomes. NH stands for new hires, NH salaries stands for starting salaries for new hires, and emp. for
employment.
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Figure 1 Ratio of labor market outcomes between demographic groups

Note: Each curve represents a ratio of one labor market outcome between young women and young men/
older women, separated by experimental and non-experimental states.
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Figure 2 Trends of new hires and separations along the research period.

Note: The two curves represent the changes in new hires and separations along the research period. Each
variable is averaged by quarter.
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APPENDIX A
Table 18 Summary Statistics for three samples, all estimates are weighted using the child's sampling
weight

Main Sample Extended Sample Comparison Sample

Children's Info
BMI z-score
Overweight
Obesity
Height is self-report
Weight is self-report
Family size, less than 3 persons
Family size, 4 persons
Family size, 5 or more persons
Family income, $1000
Child's age, in year
Child is Hispanic
Child is African American
Attachment to father
Child is female
High birth weight
Breastfed
Mother's Info.
Edu.,less than high school
Edu.,high school graduate
Edu.,some college
Edu.,college degree or higher
Mother's age
AFQT score (2006 standard)
Married, live with spouse
Mothers' Employment
Fraction of weeks worked in past month
Hours worked per week in past month, in unit 10
Fraction of weeks worked in past year
Hours worked per week in past year, in unit 10

(N=16,535)
Mean

(N=34,939)
Mean

(N=15,602)
Mean

0.28
0.27
0.12
0.51
0.53
0.09
0.36
0.55
60.58
12.02
0.08
0.15
0.77
0.49
0.1
0.57

0.35
0.29
0.13
0.51
0.53
0.22
0.39
0.39
61.56
11.82
0.07
0.15
0.77
0.48
0.11
0.54

0.24
0.27
0.12
0.38
0.4
0.21
0.37
0.42
42.89
10.67
0.08
0.19
0.72
0.48
0.1
0.45

0.12
0.44
0.23
0.21
36.64
47.64
0.73

0.11
0.44
0.24
0.21
38.04
47.23
0.7

0.19
0.52
0.22
0.08
32.69
39.47
0.66

0.65
2.32
0.65
2.32

0.69
2.56
0.7
2.59

0.65
2.39
0.65
2.39
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